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Abstract
Pre-COVID 19, countries with universal health care have experienced a rising demand for health
care services without a corresponding rise in public supply. This has led to a debate on whether to
increase private health care services - especially in hospitals and second-tier health care. Proponents
for increasing private health care highlight gains in efficiency and innovation, while opponents em-
phasize its risk to social welfare. However, the monetary value of these gains and losses is seldom
quantified. In this paper, we contribute to the debate by imputing the social value of public health
care, which does not have a market and therefore cannot be monetized. Similar to contingent valua-
tion methods that use hypothetical markets, we incorporate a hypothetical health care market into a
general equilibrium model. Social value is modeled as a byproduct of health care services and enters a
well-being household function. The model is calibrated to our unique Health Social Accounting Matrix
of Israel. Using a Monte-Carlo method, we impute the minimum social value at around 26% of pub-
lic health care financing. We furthermore simulate health care scenarios that internalize the social
value to show that when assessing the best type, policymakers should weigh the economic gains of
deregulation against the lost social value. We show that well-being may decrease in some cases from
over-privatization.
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Highlights
• Demand for health care has been rising without a corresponding rise in public supply.
• It is difficult to monetize the social value of public health care.
• There is an optimal balance between private and public health care.
• A general equilibrium model simulates a hypothetical health care market in Israel.
• The minimum social value of health care is around 26% its public financing.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades pre-COVID 19, countries with universal health care have experienced a rising
demand for health care services without a corresponding rise in public supply. This has led to a debate
on whether to increase private health care services - especially in hospitals and second-tier health
care. Proponents for increasing private health care highlight gains in efficiency and innovation, while
opponents emphasize its risk to social welfare. However, the monetary value of these gains and losses
is seldom quantified.
Health care services provide benefits above and beyond the marketed economic1 value of production
because they also generate non-marketed positive externalities. We define these as social value and
group them into two types: (i) Tangible use value, such as preventative medical care, health promotion
and communicable disease prevention. These promote economic growth through improvements in
presenteeism, morbidity and mortality. (See for example Barlow, 1967; Bhargava et al., 2001; Bleakley,
2003; Bloom et al., 2004; Weil, 2007; Stuckler, 2013, and many others).2 They furthermore promote
equal access and quality (Morris et al., 2005; Filc, 2018), health education and empowerment of people,
funding of health-related R&D, enforcement of laws and regulations, and modification of unhealthy
behavior (Carande-Kulis et al., 2007; Stuckler, 2013). (ii) Health care also generates less-tangible non-
use value, such as the caring externality (from knowing that a service is available for others to use), the
option value (from knowing a service is available to use in the future given that demand is uncertain)
(Ryan, 1996; Culyer, 1989; Olsen and Smith, 2001), solidarity, equity and fairness (Maarse and Paulus,
2003; Olsen et al., 2004b; Glied, 2008; Morris et al., 2005)3 and medical altruism (Batifoulier and Silva,
2014; Hurley and Mentzakis, 2013).
Both types of non-marketed social value are difficult to value in monetary terms and are typically
not internalized by the health care providers that create it. This causes health care to be undervalued
and suboptimally allocated from society’s point of view (Arrow, 1963; Chernew, 2001). The result is
lower well-being, which is defined as the sum of the economic and social value in society (Culyer, 1971;
Glied, 2008).4 The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the importance that public health care
systems have in coordinating and delivering health care services and the high social cost from being
underfunded. It is therefore highly important to measure and consider the implications of the social
value of health care in order to design effective policy, assign public funding and manage supply given
unknown potential risks such as COVID-19 and antimicrobial resistance (CCA, 2019; Taylor et al.,
2014). To address this issue, this paper aims to impute (in monetary terms) some of the non-marketed
social value of public health care.
A few studies address the non-marketed value of health care through willingness to pay (WTP)
for health care and willingness to accept (WTA) to forgo specific programs (e.g., Olsen et al., 2004b;
Grutters et al., 2008). The most common method used is contingent valuation methods (CVM) whereby
consumers are asked to consider specific questions about paying for/accepting particular services in
1The economic value is recorded by traditional national accounts, e.g., GDP
2Yet, the literature supporting a clear link between health and economic growth is still inconclusive (Lynch et al., 2004;
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007).
3For example, Olsen et al. 2004b show that respondents in Denmark value health care differently when framed in terms of
insurance premium or as tax contribution. The former is seen as an individual benefit, while the latter is a tax contribution to
the community with benefits beyond one self (i.e., activates altruistic preferences for fellow citizens, solidarity, equitable access
to health care, etc.)
4Culyer (1989); Brouwer et al. (2008b) and Coast et al. (2008) discuss this issue in more detail, including defining the term
Extra-Welfarism.
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a hypothetical market setup. However, most studies focus on micro-level programs, e.g., a specific
treatment (see Diener et al. (1998) and Olsen and Smith (2001) for a systematic review).
Our paper contributes in three ways: first, we use a novel computational CVM simulation, not
previously seen in health care analysis, in which we model a hypothetical health-labor market to
impute the social value of health care. Second, whereas most studies are micro-level, ours is a macro-
level approach using a general equilibrium model with Monte Carlo analysis. Finally, we illustrate
a special situation whereby regulation in the health care system can be used as a proxy to elicit the
implied social value that the public attributes (internalizes) to health care. Our novel approach could
be similarly used not only in the specific field of health care but also to other sectors (e.g., education,
public transportation, environment and others) that are heavily regulated by the government.
In the model, we introduce a hypothetical health care labor-market that simulates moving from a
regulated to a fully deregulated health care market. It also distinguishes between public and private
health care in two dimensions: (i) the provision of health care (i.e., production) and (ii) the financing of
health care (i.e., demand). The model incorporates social value as a byproduct of health care produc-
tion, and relies on the property that health-labor (i.e., physicians, nurses and paramedics) are limiting
factors in the production of health care. The government, therefore, can use wage setting and quotas
as effective tools for targeting health care policy.5
We then impute a minimum (conservative) value of the public’s WTA the current regulated health
care system, even though it creates distortions because the rise in economic welfare generated by a
hypothetical health care market exactly offsets the lost net social welfare from less available public
health care. A deregulated labor-health care market improves welfare because workers will be able to
move freely across the health care sectors, which improves the use of resources. It also allows public
and private health care production to adjust accordingly. But it reduces net social welfare (unaccounted
for in traditional national accounts) because the production of public health care falls, which lowers
the level of social welfare to households.
Environmental economics has had a long history of quantifying the value of environmental ameni-
ties.6 Our approach resembles Yerushalmi (2018) and Thiene and Tsur (2013) that impute the non-
marketed value of environmental amenities by analyzing the regulated pricing of water inputs which
are a limiting factor in agricultural production. Furthermore, in hindsight, we have developed an
approach that resembles literature on the Marginal Excess Burden (from public economics), which
compares the dead-weight loss generated by distortionary taxation with the social value created by
providing the public service.7 Here, it is the regulatory distortions to provide the government health
service (GHS) which cause the dead-weight losses rather than taxes.
Our model is calibrated to Israel, a country with universal health care, but could similarly be
applied to many others (e.g., Denmark, Canada, UK, etc). At the margin, we impute the non-marketed
social value at around 26% of public health care financing.8 Alternatively, the annual per capita social
value must be at least higher than USD 472 (2019 prices) for the public to accept the current regulated
system. The inframarginal value may be much larger, suggesting that for Israel, a reasonable level
of health care regulation provides higher socioeconomic welfare compared to a purely market-based
5For example, Blinski et al. (2018) estimate that in Israel, public physicians earn 30% to 74% less than private physician,
while performing the same tasks with similar skills.
6Hanley et al. (2003), for example, makes clear parallels between environmental and health economics, and suggests future
research avenues for health economics.
7See applied work by Ballard et al. (1985) for various industries and Brent (2016) specifically on health care.
8I.e., each $1 spent on public financing creates $0.26 in social value.
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health care system.
Finally, we note that any sort of allocation mechanism that internalizes social value will do better
ceteris paribus than ones which does not. A market mechanism that considers social value might im-
prove well-being because it would allocate resources and production more efficiently. In this paper, we
“commodify” the social value of health care. This does not mean however that we necessarily support a
complete commodification as it might not be feasible or appropriate in the first place (Pellegrino, 1999;
Timmermans and Almeling, 2009). Rather, our objective is to add to the debate on the privatization of
health care. Filc (2018) discusses the dangers of health care commodification in the context of Israel,
including for example the inequitable distribution of health care. Similarly, Glied (2008) suggests im-
posing a tax on the financing of private health care, to help fund the public sector and minimize the
negative fiscal externalities placed on the public sector. We test such a tax at the end of the paper and
conclude that the current regulated system in Israel is more efficient in its current form.
In what follows, Section 2 extends the debate on public versus private health care system and
provides a brief background on the health care services in Israel. Section 3 presents the basic model.
Section 4 collects data on Israel for model calibration and extends the model to apply to the country.
Next, Section 5 provides results, while Section 6 tests the efficiency of the current system in Israel.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. The online supplementary appendix provides additional information and
results, and also provides the computer code to reproduce this approach for other countries.
2 A mix of public and private health care
To impute social value, this paper compares two alternative health care systems (i.e., regulated versus
deregulated). Opinions are mixed on whether public and private health care should operate side-by-
side and on their optimal weight (e.g., Propper (2000) in the context of the UK and Hanson et al. (2008);
Drechsler and Jütting (2007) in the context of low-income countries).
Support for more private health care focuses on the need to respond to the rising excess demand,
to promote cost control, support research and development (R&D), and promote the efficient use of
resources through healthy competition (Andritsos and Tang, 2014; Cooper et al., 2011; Maarse and
Paulus, 2003). Competition in health care is also argued to lower prices, and enhance quality and
treatment decisions (see review by Gaynor et al., 2015). But some of these same arguments are used
to support the protection and extension of the public sector. In the case of the US, Chernichovsky
and Leibowitz (2010) argue that the lack of an integrated public health care system actually lowers
efficiency.
More closely related to our paper, Culyer (1989) discusses the many social benefits beyond the mar-
ket value that the public system generates, which are of secondary importance to the private sector
and would require regulation to internalize them. Some examples are the moral arguments that all
patients should have access to treatment, training of junior staff, and protecting against “supplier in-
duced demand” whereby the private sector pushes unnecessary treatments and procedures on patients
(Batifoulier and Silva, 2014).
Furthermore, in a mixed public-private system, where private health care is supplemental to public
services, the unmet demands of households with income above the median voters drive them to top-up
with private financing (spending), which in turn lowers their public financing (if allowed to partially
opt-out). Aggregate health care financing rises overall, but at the cost of public financing (Epple and
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Romano, 1996). Tuohy et al. (2004) confirm this empirically for OECD countries. The departure of the
wealthier (and usually healthier) from the public health care pool would reduce revenues more than
proportionally while decreasing costs less than proportionally (Glied, 2008).
A mixed system also imposes negative fiscal externalities on public provision. For example, when
patients can opt-out of public health care altogether,9 private insurers can vary premiums (to reflect
health status), making sicker patients better-off in the public system. But even-if private insurers can-
not vary premiums, mechanisms could be designed to “cream skim” the system to attract the healthier
and deter the sicker, placing an unequal burden of care on the public sector (Glied, 2008; Frank et al.,
2000).
Negative fiscal externality also occurs when private health care insurance is complementary to
services in public health care (e.g., pharmaceuticals), or when it is possible to substitute a non-price
rationing mechanism (e.g., a longer waiting list for non-life-threatening MRI scans) with direct pur-
chase of services (out-of-pocket), which is complementary to treatments in the public system. Both
compound the moral hazard effect inherent in the public system and raise the demand for the services
covered, but without raising the premiums of private insurance or the costs of direct purchases (Glied,
2008).
Finally, because the health insurance market is not perfectly competitive, premiums are not actuar-
ily fair. Additional costs are loaded onto insurance premiums, causing the more risk averse consumers
to opt-out of private insurance. Competition between the public and private systems increase welfare
losses because additional loading represents costs above opportunity cost. Also, the opportunity costs
themselves are higher because of lowered scale economies, and because other activities to reduce costs
are foregone (Culyer, 1989).
To mitigate some of these market failures, private-public partnerships (PPP) have been set up,
whereby the private party provides public services and bears significant risk and management respon-
sibility. Roehrich et al. (2014) provide a systematic literature review of this type of partnerships, and
find that opinions are mixed: PPP may allow the public sector to access idiosyncratic resources and ca-
pabilities that would help innovative and improve health service quality (e.g., Kivleniece and Quelin,
2012). However, it could also create low value for money, higher cost of capital and stifle innovation. In
the case of Israel, Filc and Davidovitch (2016b) argue that PPP blurred the boundaries of health care
services between private and public, leading the system towards lower equity and efficiency.
2.1 A brief overview of health care in Israel
Rosen et al. (2015); Filc and Davidovitch (2016b) and Filc (2018) provide a detailed overview of the
health care system in Israel and its historical background. Briefly, the introduction of the National
Health Insurance Law (adopted in 1995) transformed the country from a corporatist/social security
system into a universal one, secured through a managed competition model. Every citizen, or perma-
nent resident, must be a member of one of four competing, non-profit, health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMO). The HMOs are required to supply a list of medical services and treatments selected for
the government’s benefits package (called the “health care basket”). To separate payment from care,
the system is financed primarily through a combination of a health-specific payroll tax and general
taxation. The government distributes funds among the HMOs according to a capitation formula that
9As in Germany and Netherlands.
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accounts for the number of members in each plan, their age mix, gender and place of residence (i.e.,
country center/periphery). To foster competition and attract new members, HMOs can furthermore
provide additional service top-ups not covered by the basic health care basket.
Similar to many other western countries, in the mid-1980s, Israel began a process of neoliberaliza-
tion which saw the privatization of various social welfare services including health care. The aim was
to improve efficiency, but also due to changes in ideology (Filc and Davidovitch, 2016b). The process of
neoliberalization coincided with a period of accelerated growth in net demand for health care services
that stemmed from a rise in household incomes, the widening variety of health care services on offer
and an aging population. For example, even though GDP per capita increased by 1.6% (WB, 2020), the
number of physicians per 1,000 people declined from a high of 3.85 in 1999 to 3.1 in 2018 (BoI, 2019).
To catch up with demand, the health care system moved towards faster growth in private health
care production, and a small number of public hospitals were allowed to introduce private services.10
Between 1995 and 2018, private health care production per capita increased by 3.5% (in real terms,
on average per year) compared to 1.2% in public health care. The result was a decline in the weight of
public health care production from 67% in 1995 to around 60% in 2018 (CBS, 2019, Table 9a).11 Public
health care financing also dropped sharply from 66% to 61% between 1995 to 2012, later rising to
64% by 2018 (CBS, 2019, Table 5). This trend was supplemented by high growth in private financing
through private insurance and patient co-payments (Chernichovsky, 2013; BoI, 2015; Rosen et al.,
2015).
This private supply response only partially solved the acute excess demand, dubbed a “health care
crisis”. As a reaction, the Israeli government set up the German Committee to critically assess and
suggest policy reforms (German, 2014). Discussions included lowering regulatory barriers (e.g., by
easing access to private services, removing frictions in the labor market and relaxing wage settings in
the public system). But the committee’s main focus centered on policies to strengthen public health
care, to mitigate the rising negative fiscal externality and inequitable access associated with rising
private health care. Indeed, since 2013, public financing has reversed course and gradually climbed to
64% in 2018 (CBS, 2019, Table 5), a reaction to the rising risk of damaging (or even destroying) the
public system. The aim of this paper is therefore to quantify the social value of health care internalized
by the pubic using a formal quantitative model.
Several Israeli studies provide anecdotal evidence of the lost social value but seldom include a
quantitative approach. For example, they discuss the use of public hospital resources for commercial
gains (Ombudsman, 2013), physicians moonlighting in the private health care system during hours
devoted to the public health care, the rising workload of residual employees in public hospitals, and
rising wage gaps between physicians in the private and public health care systems (Chernichovsky,
2013; Chernichovsky and Regev, 2014; Ben Naim and Blinksy, 2019). Furthermore, duplication of
health care payments (i.e., first, through taxes and second, privately), and inefficient use of publicly
funded infrastructure (e.g., underutilized facilities during afternoon and evening hours) parallel to
booming investments for similar facilities in the private sector (Chernichovsky, 2013; Achdut, 2019).
Finally, studies in Israel link the rising privatization with a rise in poverty and inequality (Navon
and Chernichovsky, 2012; Filc and Davidovitch, 2016b). While these developments have galvanized
10Filc and Davidovitch (2016b) provide a detailed background of private services within public hospitals.
11Not to confuse later on, our model focuses on the hospitals and second-tier health care. Our definition of private health care
mainly relies on out-of-pocket payments and premiums for supplementary and commercial insurance. This lowers the weight
of the private sector from 40% (as reported by CBS, discussed above) to around 25%. Further details are provided in the data
collection section 4.1.
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support for protecting the public system, the debate on the optimal mix is still ongoing. The next
section describes our health model with which we use to impute the net social value of public health
care.
3 The basic health care model
Economy-wide, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been used in health care policy
(Hsu et al., 2015; Rutten and Reed, 2009; Borger et al., 2008; Kabajulizi et al., 2017), skilled medical
personnel (Rutten, 2009), value of physical activity (Hafner et al., 2020), HIV/AIDS (Kambou et al.,
1992; Thurlow et al., 2009), pandemic influenza (Smith et al., 2011), antimicrobial resistance (Smith
et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2014; CCA, 2019), Alzheimer disease (Keogh-Brown et al., 2016) and Malaria
vaccine (Yerushalmi et al., 2019). But to our knowledge, our paper is the first to use this method to
elicit the non-marketed social value of public health care.
Our novel contribution is the acknowledgment that public health care also creates a byproduct
value that could be lost when deregulating the health care market - a point not mentioned in CGE
health models. Here, we elicit the non-marketed social value of public health care by weighing the
additional economic benefits of a deregulated market with the losses incurred by a reduction in the
non-market social value.
3.1 Model Setup
To simplify our model to its core, we present a ’mock-up’ that focuses on the health care sector. For the
moment, it omits other accounts such as other (non-health) government services, the rest of the world
and investment. These will be incorporated later, in section 4.3, when fitting the model to Israel based
on our unique 2012 Israel Health Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). These amendments, however, will
not alter the overall structure presented below.
In the model, a government regulates the provision of health care (e.g., through operating permits
for private hospitals, wage capping and price control). Public hospitals are non-profit organizations
that technically belong to the private sector but classified as a public sector. Both private households
and the government demand health care services, which are supplied by public and private firms (e.g.,
hospitals and other medical clinics). Public health care services provide social value, as a byproduct of
production, which however they do not internalize.
In the counterfactual simulations, the government deregulates health care and enables a hypothet-
ical pure health care labor market. The model measures the quantity of health-labor units that would
migrate between private and public health care firms, changes to health care services and changes to
welfare.
To sharpen the focus on the model and its results, without risking losing too much, we omit various
properties of market imperfections (e.g., economies of scale, excludability, cost of coordination, imper-
fect information, etc). We set up an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium as a complementarity problem.12 The
model is coded in GAMS13 using the MPSGE sub-language (Rutherford, 1995). (The online supple-
mentary content includes further equations, model code, and calibration.)
12A complementarity constraint enforces that for variables x and y: x · y = 0, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. See Rutherford (1995) for further
information.
13http://www.gams.com/
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3.2 Production of health care and other goods (supply)
Output yi is supplied at price pi by three production sectors: private health care services, public health
care services and all other production defined by set i = [pri, pub, other], with j alias to i. The two
health care products (i.e., private or public) are close substitutes but not homogeneous.14
Firm i maximizes profits given a multi-level, differentiable, constant return to scale (CRS) produc-
tion function:
Max pii = piyi −
riki + wili +∑
j
pjyji

s.t. yi ≥ CES (yji,KLi,Aji, σ1i) (1)
KLi ≥ δiCES (ki, li, αi, σ2i) (2)
In the lower-level, (2) combines capital ki and labor li inputs through a Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution (CES) function that have prices wi and ri (respectively).15 σ2i is the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital, αi their share parameter, and δi a scaling factor.16 In the top-level (1), the
capital-labor value added, KLi, is combined with intermediate inputs yji to form yi, with Aji their
share parameters and σ1i the substitution elasticity between them.
3.3 Financing health care (demand)
Households obtain health care services through three main channels: (i) through Gd, the government
health services (GHS) that produces health care services in-house, or through outsourcing services
to the private sector.17 (ii) Through cpri, privately-financed private-health care services (i.e., out-of-
pocket expenditures and premiums for supplementary and commercial insurance), and (iii) through
cpub, privately-financed public-health care, which is an out-of-pocket expense beyond the normal health
basket provided by GHS. (Figure 1 helps to visual how the supply of health care is financed by private
and public demand.)
3.3.1 Government Health Service (GHS)
We assume that the budget of the Government Health Service (GHS) is always balanced18, and is
obtained in two ways: (i) txh revenue from a health tax that is levied on households consumption ci at
14For example, the public service offers accessibility to all, emergency and trauma care, and links to research activities. The
private sector, on the other hand, suggests higher accessibility to the medical team, a more customer friendly environment,
and easier possibility to choose a doctor (surgery). However, it could choose to reject specific patients (e.g., high-risk complex
procedures, or elderly patients with longer recovery time), which forces the public sector to feel these gaps.
15Labor units for health care, pri or pub are defined as the combination of physicians, nurses and paramedic staff that deliver
the necessary labor inputs for medical care. In the applied model to Israel (starting from Section 4), we also include non-health
care labor as an additional separate input.
16This represents the functional form KLi = δiCES (ki, li, αi, σ1i) = δi
(
α
1
σ2i
i k
σ2i−1
σ2i
i + (1− αi)
1
σ2i l
σ2i−1
σ2i
i
) σ2i
σ2i−1
. Solving
this type of problem is quite standard. Note that when σ = 0, the CES function converges to a Leontief (fixed shares) function,
while when σ = 1 it would be a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function.
17For example, the government owns hospitals and equipment (i.e., capital) and pays for labor inputs to provide health care
services, in-house. The government could also outsource health care production to the private sector, whereby the government
buys privately produced health care using public financing. Note, furthermore, that in Israel, HMO’s also own hospitals and
other medical clinics, which we included in the public system.
18In Israel, the government makes up for the hospitals chronic deficits.
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Figure 1: The production and finance of health care services
Financing (demand)
Public Private
Production
(supply)
Public, ypub
Public financing of public
health care services Gd
Private financing of public
health care services cpub
Private, ypri
Public financing of
private health care
Private financing of
private health care cpri
The figure summarizes the distinction between public-private production and financing.
rate τh
txh = τh
∑
i
pici (3)
and (ii) from ownership of capital (e.g., hospitals and equipment) kg with rental rate r.
GHS supplies Gsh by
max Gsh ≥ CES (ypub, ypri,G, σh)
s.t. pGGsh = rkg + txh (4)
with G the share parameter, and σh a high substitution elasticity between public and private health
care production.
Three limitations need to be mentioned. First, we assumed (in section 3.2) that private health care
services are perfectly competitive. This is a simplification as they are, in fact, a Cournot-competitive
sector with a degree of market power. Second, public health care is a monopsony in demand for health-
labor inputs, though this issue is already implied within the calibrated stage of the regulated system.
For simplicity, we omitted these to reduce the level of additional assumptions required for calibration.
We are aware that we lose these strategic behavioral elements when simulating a deregulated scenario,
but we believe that the results will not be significantly different and simpler to interpret. Finally, deep
parameters (e.g., elasticities, production technology) are invariant across the scenarios.19 This further
simplification is justified given the level of additional uncertainty it would add to the model.
3.3.2 Household economic welfare
Household well-being W has two components: economic welfare (utility) U and social welfare E. The
former is calculated from the national accounts, and the latter will be developed in Section 3.5 and
imputed for Israel in Section 5.
A social planner maximizes a continuous, multi-level, CES function with an implementability con-
straint, as follows:
max U = CES (chealth, cother, α2, σ1) (5)
s.t. chealth = δhCES
(
cpri, cpub, G
d
h, α1, σh
)
(6)∑
pici = rk
s +
∑
i
wil
s
i − txh + pGh ·Gdh︸ ︷︷ ︸
=budget
(7)
19For instance, a healthier person or rise in income may change household consumption behavior and price sensitivity.
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In the lower-level (6), households bundle health care goods chealth using a CES function. σh is a high
substitution elasticity, α1 is their share parameter, and δh a scale parameter. In the top-level (5), health
care goods are bundled with all other goods, with σ1 a low substitution elasticity (i.e., compliments),
and α2 the share parameter.
Note that this utility function implies a unit income elasticity of health care demand (i.e., a normal
good). Martín et al. (2011) review empirical studies and find ambiguous results (some estimate a
luxury good, others closer to a normal good, and others a necessity good). We choose to assume a normal
good because households are aggregated (rather than being heterogeous by income level, region, or
ethnic group) and to simplify our model.
Household budget is composed of capital endowments ks =
∑
i ki and labor l
s
i , each having its own
separate labor market i. txh is the health tax revenue for GHS, explained previously.
Since GHS provides free health care at the point of services, we “mechanically” endow households
with Gdh that has a price pGh . Two complementary slackness constraints are added
Gdh ≥ 0, Gsh −Gdh ≥ 0, Gdh
(
Gsh −Gdh
)
= 0 (8)
τh ≥ 0, pG − pGh ≥ 0, τh (pG − pGh) = 0 (9)
Gdh is a slack parameter of public health care consumption, and τh from (3) a slack health tax
parameter. Both adjust endogenously to maintain constraints (8) and (9). In such a way, whatever
GHS provides in (4) is actually endowed and consumed by the households in (6); the optimal level
of public health care provision is such that maximizes the household’s welfare. Note that this is a
simplified Samuelson Rule (Samuelson, 1954) because there is only one representative household and
we do not need to consider how Gdh is allocated among them.
20
3.4 Deregulating the health care labor market
The health-labor markets pub, pri ∈ i are sector specific that have market clearing conditions lsi = li.21
The regulated public health care system sets wages that are different from the private sector, wpub 6=
wpri. In each market, production hires as many workers as required so that the marginal productivity
of labor (MPLi) equal their real wages:
li ≥ 0, wi
pi
−MPLi ≥ 0, li
(
MPLi − wi
pi
)
= 0, ∀i (10)
which do not necessarily equal across the sectors, i.e., MPLpub 6= MPLpri.22
In a deregulated (counterfactual) scenario, a hypothetical labor market allows health-workers to
move freely between the private and public health care sectors. Following from (10), if say wpubppub =
MPLpub < MPLpri =
wpri
ppri
, the private sector would prefer to hire additional workers (and the public
sector to shed worker), up to a point where MPLpub = MPLpri.
20The Samuelson Rule shows that the sum of the marginal rate of substitutions between the private and public good (X and
G, respectively), across all households, equals the marginal rate of transformation between the private and public good, i.e.,
for two households, U1G/U
1
X + U
2
G/U
2
X = FG/FX . In our case, there is only one representative household, which removes this
complication.
21Labor equations for other ∈ i are omitted for simplicity because they are not relevant to the main issue. They are included
in the full model.
22(10) is a complementarity problem, i.e., if demand for labor l > 0, then MPL = w/p, else if l = 0, then MPL < w/p.
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Thus, when a labor market is enabled, two mutually exclusive channels transfer L units from one
sector to the other by
Lpub→pri ≥ 0, wpub − wpri ≥ 0,Lpub→pri (wpub − wpri) = 0 (11)
Lpri→pub ≥ 0, wpri − wpub ≥ 0,Lpri→pub (wpri − wpub) = 0 (12)
with wpub and wpri the real wages for the public and private sectors, respectively.23
When (11) is enabled, Lpub→pri > 0 workers are exchanged up to the point where public and private
have equalized wages, wpub = wpri. If, however, the unit wage of the public is higher than the unit
wage of the private, wpub > wpri (a strict inequality), the activity goes slack, Lpub→pri = 0. In this case,
(12) becomes an active channel.
Finally, the counterfactual health-labor market clearing condition is updated to
∑
i li =
∑
i l
s
i and
wpub = wpri.
3.5 Modeling the non-marketed social value
Thus far, we excluded the possibility for non-marketed social value. Now, in addition to the production
process from (1), public health care production ypub also creates positive non-marketed externality E.
This byproduct is modeled in fixed proportion to public health care production with a shadow price pE .
The sector does not internalize the social value it generates because a fictive tax rate set to τE = 100%,
which removes any of its revenue.
Omitting the subscript pub, the updated public health care production is
Max pi = (1− τE) pEE︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ py − Cost (·) (13)
s.t. y ≥ min {y, θE}
y ≥ CES (k, l, yj)
with θ the calibrated share parameter of the social value. When θ = 0, social value is omitted from the
calibration, and otherwise when θ > 0.
On the demand side, households consumes goods as in (5), and also the non-marketed social value
E. The fictive tax revenue, pEE from (13) is directly transferred to households as an endowment, which
they consume entirely. Thus, households maximizes well-being W by
max W = CES (U,E, α5, σ5) (14)
s.t. budgetW = budget+ τEpEE
budgetW is the updated budget constraint (that combines (7), the “traditional” national accounts,
with the social value of health care), α5 the share ratio of the externality and σ5 = 0 that converges
the function to fixed proportion. Note that when α5 = 0, the social value is omitted from the baseline
calibration, and W = U . Else, when α5 > 0, W 6= U .
23In the calibrated baseline, total costs are set to unity, so wages are in real terms.
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Three points to note: First, it is important to realize that in this setup, different baseline calibra-
tions of the social value will not affect the counterfactual general equilibrium outcomes of the marketed
commodities. There is only one counterfactual solution for the goods markets because (i) firms produce
according to their profit maximizing problem without internalizing the byproduct social value they
create, and (ii) households consume as many byproducts provided to them. In this setup, the only dif-
ference between a model with and without the social value of health care will be the interpretation of
welfare. Second, as previously discussed, the private health care sector imposes negative externality
on the public sector, but it also creates social value. Since health care policy was set while considering
this issue, the social value that we impute represents the net social value. Using CRS functions main-
tains this in the counterfactual scenarios. Finally, using a fixed transformation function imply a zero
transformation elasticity between the public health care production and its social value, and therefore
imputes a lower-bound value.24 It also means that its change in value is constant, i.e., not diminishing,
as more of it is available. This is a simplification of reality.
4 Calibrating the health care model to Israel
To calibrate the model to Israel, we construct a unique health-focused social accounting matrix (SAM)
for the year 2012 (provided in Table 1). This is a balanced table of incomes and expenditures across
multiple aggregate national accounts. A few obstacles were considered while constructing the Health
SAM: first, due to the blurred boundaries between public and private health care (as previously men-
tioned), official data that disaggregates health-labor input hours and wage differentials among these
sectors is not available.25 Second, the best available symmetric input-output table provided by the
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) is from 2006. This is rather old. When intersecting these
issues, 2012 was chosen as the base year because it best fitted the data at an aggregate level. Though
newer health data is available, the differences at a macroeconomic level are insignificant, and would
not alter our main results.
4.1 Health Social Accounting Matrix
To generate a health-focused SAM (Table 1), CBS provided us with a 205 industry level disaggregation
of Use and Supply tables 2012.26 We furthermore used the 2012 national accounts data (CBS, 2018),
2012 labor force survey (CBS, 2015), the national expenditure for health 2014 (CBS, 2019), and the
2006 symmetric Input-Output table (CBS, 2014). These are combined to create a detailed health SAM
with five health sectors.27
To simplify the model, we then aggregated the detailed SAM into four industries: (i, ii) Private
and Public health care services: the two main competitors of health care provision and the focus of
this paper. These are mainly hospitals and second-tier health services. (iii) Other health: a fully
private Pharma industry that supplies medicine manufacture, medical supplies, private dental care,
24Using a higher parameter would only raise the imputed social value of public health care.
25Examples of the blurrred boundary are when operating theaters and physicians/nurses work for the public health care
services during the day, but then for the private health care later in the evenings. Another is when public hospitals offer
additional private services such as private lodging for women in post-natal care and medical tourism. See further discussion in
Chernichovsky (2013); Filc and Davidovitch (2016b) and Filc (2018).
26CBS provided these tables by special request; they are not online.
27The detailed Israeli health SAM is available in the Online Supplementary Appendix. See Section A, Table 8.
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Table 1: Health social accounting matrix for Israel, 2012
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187,190 Private health 1,075    13,022  9          1,049     14,094   -         60           29,310
188,189 Public health 25         10,857  -       402        2,447     46,796     -         1,069       61,597
82 Other health 2,049    12,769  5,232    10,866    11,755   1,982      30,088     74,741
Other Other goods 5,674    1,761    33,425  895,286  526,939 176,034   208,245  (18,467)    1,828,899
Labor private 
health 10,664   -          10,664
Labor public 
health 18,766  18,766
Labor other 7,075    453,403  (26,769)    433,709
capital 6,148    1,437    29,121  309,380  346,086
Households 10,664  18,766  433,709 346,086  116,391   15,639     941,255
Government 1,948     60,460 104,589  149,259  13,746     330,002
Gov health 
services 46,796   46,796
Production 
Taxes 1,122    2,985    (122)      56,475    60,460
sales Taxes 2,553    -       -       102,036  104,589
Income tax 148,158 1,101       149,259
Health tax 46,796   46,796
Savings-
investment -       189,118 37,577    -          (16,468)    210,227
Rest of world 0
29,310 61,597 74,741 1,828,899 10,664 18,766 433,709 346,086 941,255 330,002 46,796 60,460 104,589 149,259 46,796 210,227 0
Source: CBS (2014, 2015, 2018, 2019) and authors arrangement.
and medical equipment to all sectors.28 Finally, (iv) Other goods: all other non-health industries
and services, aggregated together for simplicity (including non-health government services, such as
education).
Table 1 characterizes the overall structure of production, consumption, investment, and interna-
tional trade in the Israeli economy. It relies on merging a balanced double-entry national accounts
data with the 2012 labor force survey (CBS, 2015). Following basic accounting rules (i.e., income, ex-
penditure, and production approaches), the Health SAM in Table 1 shows that the GDP for 2012 was
indeed NIS 1001 million (mln).
On their own, Table 1 and the detailed SAM in the online appendix are a unique piece of informa-
tion from a health accounting perspective that have not been presented in previous studies in Israel,
and rarely for other countries. They provide a detailed process of purchasing intermediate goods in
the supply chain of health care.29 It furthermore uses the 2012 labor force survey (CBS, 2015) to
match similar skills and differentiate them from the rest of the non-health-labor. This allows us to
calibrate health-labor units, which will migrate across the public and private health care sectors once
deregulation is enabled (as discussed in Section 3.4).
Based on the Health SAM (Table 1), Table 2 summarizes the national health care output by operat-
ing sector (production) and by financing agent (demand). This cross-tabulation was depicted in Figure
1, previously. In 2012, excluding other health, total health care expenditure stood at NIS 64 billion
(bln), around 6.4% of GDP. The public sector provided 78% of health production while the private
health care provided 22%.30 Public health care financing (by government ministries, local authorities
and public non-private institutions) amounted to 74%, with private financing (out-of-pocket and pre-
miums for supplementary and commercial insurance) at 26%.31 Note that CBS include Other health
within private health care financing, and therefore report private finance at around 40% of total fi-
28We separated this sector from the main health sectors because our focus is on hospital and second-tier services. Engelchin-
Nissan and Shmueli (2015) used a similar logic.
29E.g., public health care purchases NIS 12,769 mln from other health.
30From the SAM (Table 1), production for public, 2,447+46,796+1,069 and for private, 14,094+60.
31From the SAM (Table 1), financing for public, 46,796 and for private, 14,094+2,447.
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Table 2: National health care expenditure by production and financing
bln NIS, 2012 % of total % of GDP
Healthcare output by operating provider (production)
Public 50.3 78% 5.0%
Private 14.2 22% 1.4%
Total 64.5 100% 6.4%
Healthcare expenditure by financing sector (demand)
Public 46.8 74% 4.7%
Private 16.5 26% 1.7%
Total 63.3 100% 6.3%
Source: CBS (2014, 2018, 2019) and authors calculations. The table shows the split between private-public production and financing.
nance (as discussed in the background section 2.1). Our definition of health care is narrower and thus
changes the public-private weights. Others studies provide approximately similar ratios to ours, which
they estimate through different means. For example, OECD calculate the 2012 out-of-pocket estimates
at 23.4% of total finance OECD (2020), while Engelchin-Nissan and Shmueli (2015) estimate private
finance at 15%.32
Finally, the SAM furthermore characterizes the tax system, dividing it into four main types: income
tax (direct tax), sales tax (indirect tax), production tax (tax on labor and capital) and health tax. Health
tax in our model refers to all source of financing of the GHS. This includes the tax collected by the
National Insurance Institution designated to the health system, and government tax transfers from
the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health. From the data, we calculate the average health
tax rate at 4.7% of GDP, which is consistent with the level of public expenditure on health care (CBS,
2018).
4.2 Calibrating labor and wage gaps
Next, we calibrate the baseline health-labor wage differential between the private and public sectors,
which adjust freely once deregulation is enabled.33 This information is not available because health
professionals can work on a "dual practice", blurring the boundaries (e.g., physicians can work in the
private sector while also holding a salaried job in a public hospital).
Using the 2012 Labour Force Survey (LFS), we estimate that the health sector employed around
191.8 thousand people, of which 25.9 thousand were physicians, 35.4 thousand nurses and 130.5 thou-
sand paramedical and administrative staff (CBS, 2015, tables 2.2 and 2.18). Next, no data is available
that further splits into pubic or private health care. We therefore disaggregate health employees into
five categories according to ISCO 4 digit classification (based on LFS): (1) General hospitals, (2) Public
clinics, (3) Dentistry, (4) Private medical clinics and institutes, and (5) Other human health activities.
We collect micro-level evidence for private/public health mix, and finally, calculate a weighted average
split.
We estimate that approximately 75% of labor input (143.1 thousand) were employed in the public
health sector while 25% (48.7 thousand) operated in the private health sector. By dividing the wage
32OECD (2020) use the System of Health Accounts (SHA) 2011, OECD estimates of 2018, and other non-SHA sources. They
remove the (supplemental) voluntery private health insurance and expenditures made by non-profit organizations. Engelchin-
Nissan and Shmueli (2015) use a different approach all together. They link the 2009 Israel Health survey with the 2010 Incomes
Survey. They remove private dental, mental and nursing health care to obtain the out-of-pocket expense.
33Recall, health-labor units are a composite of physicians, nurses and paramedical staff.
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Table 3: Employee numbers and wage differentials
Health care production
Public Private
Wage bill (NIS mln) 18,766 10,664
Employees (1000s) 143.1 48.7
Wage per employee (NIS 1000, per year) 131.1 219.0
Source: Health SAM and CBS (2018); The table shows that the average wage gap is 67% higher in the private sector relative to
the public health care sector. Similar results are estimated by micro-level studies in Israel.
bill (from the SAM) by the number of employees in the public and private sectors, we calculate the
average wage per employee at around NIS 131 and NIS 219 thousand per year, respectively (see Table
3); a wage gap of around 67% higher in the private sector. This matches related, micro-level, studies
in Israel (Blinski et al., 2018).34
In a pure market economy, wage differences are explained by gaps in marginal productivity of
labor, which is linked to the volume and quality of the physical capital stock, the skills/quality of
human capital (including the degree of commitment of the employees to their place of work) and other
sources of productivity. In Israel, since the quality of health-labor inputs is the same for both private
and public sectors, one would expect the same level of productivity and therefore a much narrower
gap in wages. Indeed, if private and public services are close substitutes, the private and public wages
should be the same. But in practice, they are quite different because of the heavily regulated health
care system, wage caps in the public sector and labor quotas. As we show later, we use this source of
distortion to impute the social value of public healthcare.
4.3 The applied model
We calibrate the “mock-up” model (from section 3) to the Israeli Health SAM described previously. The
applied model has four production sectors, two public/private sector specific health-labor inputs, and
a non-health labor input which is flexible across all sectors. Figure 2 depicts the nested production
structure based on equations (1) and (2). As in many standard applied models, capital and (non-
health) labor are assumed a Cobb-Douglas function. Next, health-labor inputs are assigned a low
substitution elasticity of 0.1 to capture their specialized nature. On the intermediate inputs side, we
use low substitution elasticities of 0.1 and 0.3 (see figure 2). Finally, in the lowest nest, private and
public health care are bundled as intermediate inputs with a high substitution elasticity to express
their competing nature and close similarity, though not perfect substitutes. Unfortunately, there is no
available literature to help narrow down its value. Based on other applied CGE models that consider
high substitute goods or inputs, we assign a mid-point value of σh = 5. Since this is an important
parameter, we test for a wide range of values between 2 to 10, and finally incorporate this into a
Monte-Carlo simulation, to provide a distribution of the possible result.
Next, Figure 3 illustrates the application of the economic welfare U (described in 5 and 6). Goods
are bundled into consumption within a multi-level nested structure. In the lowest-nest, households
demand privately and publicly financed health care, again with the high substitution elasticity of σh =
34For example, the Israeli Ministry of Finance estimate that for the same procedures and skills, the relative wages of physi-
cians (with more than 10 years of experience) in private health care to public health care is 74% higher in plastic surgery, 63%
higher in Ophthalmology, and 50% higher in Orthopedic surgery and EEG. For most other specialization, private health care
wages are at least 30% higher (Blinski et al., 2018).
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Figure 2: Production
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The figure shows the multi-level nested production function used
in the full model.
The figure shows the multi-level nested utility function in the full
model. Fixed savings ratio, with consumption aggregated by the
goods.
Table 4: Exogenous Parameters
Lower Mid Upper
Parameter Definition
σh Substitution between private and public health care 2 5 10
σ1 Substitution between health and other goods 0.25 1.5 3
5.35 Health care services (i.e., hospitals and second tier services) is then combined with other types
of health goods (e.g., Pharma) with a substitution elasticity of σ2 = 0.3, representing quite different
products.
Finally, another key parameter is σ1, the substitution elasticity between health and other goods in
the second nest. As shown for general cases by Shoven and Whalley (1992) and Perroni and Rutherford
(1995), we can narrow the range of the substitution elasticity by σ1 = +σ0(θ1−θ0)(θ1−1) that links empirical
estimates of the compensated demand elasticity, , and expenditure shares, θ0 and θ1 (from our Health
SAM).36
Borger et al. (2008) and Ringel et al. (2002) summarize many empirical studies that estimate . The
consensus falls on an inelastic demand elasticity of 0.2 to 0.8 (in absolute terms), and a highly cited
empirical estimate from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment find it to be 0.2 (Manning et al.,
1987). These however assume that the health market is unregulated. But in the case of Israel, and
similar countries, the true elasticity needs to reflect the unmet excess demand generated by a regulated
system, before simulating deregulation. We therefore expect demand to be more price responsive, i.e.,
more elastic.
In a new study, Kowalski (2016) uses a censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV) that al-
lows estimates to vary across conditional expenditure distributions. She finds that the demand price
elasticity on health services is substantially higher, and varies from 0.76 to 1.49 (in absolute terms).
Using these values and the expenditure shares from the Health SAM, we can narrow σ1 (based on the
calibrating equation from above) to around 0.87 and 1.7. Borger et al. (2008), for example, assumes
35In Figure 3, differentiating the top nest health care services into two sub-nets is redundant when they have the same
substitution elasticity. We do this for reporting purposes to calculate separately public and private financing and production.
36The equation is derived in the online Supplementary Appendix B. θ1 is the share of health expenditure from total consump-
tion, and θ0 is the share of health expenditure from total utility.
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a substitution elasticity of 1 between health and other goods. For simplicity, we assign a mid-point
elastic value of σ1 = 1.5, which will capture the movement from a regulated to de-regulated health
system with unmet demands for health services. We furthermore conduct sensitivity tests for a range
between 0.25 ≤ σ1 ≤ 3, and also incorporate this into a Monte-Carlo simulation. Table 4 summarizes
the main unknown parameters.
4.3.1 Other closure rules
We conclude with three closure rules that “fit” the applied model to the data and ensure that we can
interpret welfare correctly. First, we assume that the government provides a fixed level of non-health
services, in real terms. A constraint is added whereby any budget surplus (or deficit) is transferred
(received) from the household so that the government maintains a balanced budget.37 Second, being a
static model, the current account is fixed to baseline levels, and the government, household and rest
of the world save a fixed proportion of income. Otherwise when the current account deficit rises, for
example, it would act as a ‘free gift’. In the long-run, the current account should balance on average.
Finally, a capital account equates total savings (i.e., private, public and foreign) with demand for
investment.
5 Results
To impute the social value of public health care E from (13), we simulate the introduction of a health
care market. Deregulation allows health workers to freely migrate between the public and private
health care sectors, wages in the public sector are no longer capped, and private health care providers
can choose the level of services to produce based on profit maximizing rules.
Results are presented in stages: first, excluding the social value of public health care. Second,
including the social value, and finally, we search for a deregulated health care system that also inter-
nalizes some of the social value.
5.1 Results excluding the social value
In the case where the social value of public health care is not accounted for, welfare is equivalent
to total household expenditure, i.e., W = U in (5) and (14) is redundant. The simulation finds that
deregulating the health care system would raise welfare U by 0.2% to 0.7% in real expenditure, relative
to the baseline. This range depends on σh, the level of the substitution elasticity between private
and public health care. With a higher value, it becomes easier to substitute one for the other, and
deregulation yields higher economic benefits. In monetary terms, this is an increase of NIS 1.4 to 5.7
bln (2012 prices), equivalent to 0.13% to 0.45% of additional GDP. As an extreme test, in a case where
σh → ∞ (i.e., perfect substitutes) the increase in welfare U converges to around 1.8%. As expected,
this is a corner solution whereby the public sector completely shuts down.
Table 5 reports the simulated changes to (i) health care production by the operating provider and
(ii) expenditure by financing sector. For mid-value parameters, total health care production rises by
10.1% after becoming more efficient and relatively more affordable. However, the share of public
health care production falls from 78% (in the baseline regulated regime) to 62% of the total (after
37The government receives income from non-health taxes, net-funds from the households and rest of the world (see Table 1).
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Table 5: Public and private production and financing (% share, bln NIS real 2012)
Regulated Deregulated (counterfactual)
(Baseline) σh = 2 σh = 5 σh = 10
Healthcare output by operating provider
Public 78% 72% 62% 49%
Private 22% 28% 38% 51%
Total (bln NIS, real 2012) 64.5 67.2 71.0 76.0
% change from baseline 4.3% 10.1% 17.8%
Healthcare expenditure by financing sector
Public 74% 68% 58% 45%
Private 26% 32% 42% 55%
Total (bln NIS, real 2012) 63.3 66.1 69.8 74.8
% change from baseline 4.4% 10.3% 18.1%
The table reports on the changing weights (% share) and monetary value of public and private health care pro-
duction and financing. σh is the substitution elasticity between public and private health care.
deregulation). Similarly, total health care financing rises by 10.3%, while the share of public financing
falls from 74% to 58%. Not shown in the table, expenditure for other health goods (i.e., Pharma
industry and others) rises by 10.3% in real term because it is a complimentary intermediate input
for health care production. Finally, expenditure for other goods in the economy falls by 1.1% because
health care becomes relatively more affordable. (Further detailed results are presented in the online
supplementary appendix, Tables 9 and 10.)
The intuition behind the rise in utility is the elimination of resource misallocation. Based on the
calibration, private health-labor wages are 66% higher than the public, but have similar skills. Dereg-
ulation allows public health care workers to migrate towards the private sector until a new equilibrium
is reached where real costs are the same. Production in the economy adjusts, and households have ac-
cess to more goods for a given level of budget. For mid-value parameters, Table 6 reports that 27.3
thousand health-workers would migrate from the public to the private health care sector (a 19% de-
crease in public health care workforce). Real-wages in the private sector falls by around 41% but could
rise (or fall) in the public sector depending on σh. For example, with lower elasticity such as σh = 2,
demand for public health care remains strong and wages rise by 11%. But with higher elasticities, the
decrease in demand for public health care is stronger than the decrease in supply, and therefore, public
health care output price and real wage fall. This outcome is due to general equilibrium effects which
would not be captured by partial equilibrium analysis.
We furthermore perform sensitivity tests with 0.25 ≤ σ1 ≤ 3, the substitution elasticity between
health and other goods. As expected, an increase in σ1 (i.e., better substitutes) raises the real expendi-
ture on health care goods relative to other goods, welfare rises, and the number of public health care
employees migrating to the public sector rises.38
The overall conclusion, so far, is that introducing a market mechanisms into the health care system
would raise welfare. However, this is a partial view that excludes the lost social value that the public
health care generates, which we impute in the next section.
38For further results from the sensitivity tests, see Section C.1 of the online Supplementary Appendix.
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Table 6: Changes to wages, prices, and worker reallocated
Regulated Deregulation (counterfactual)
(baseline) σh = 2 σh = 5 σh = 10
# of workers (000s) Level % diff Level % diff Level % diff
Private healthcare 48.7 61.0 25.3% 12.3 76.0 56.0% 27.3 96.2 97.5% 47.5
Public healthcare 143.1 130.8 -8.6% -12.3 115.8 -19.0% -27.3 95.6 -33.2% -47.5
Wage (000s, per year) NIS NIS % diff NIS % diff NIS % diff
Private healthcare 219.0 145.5 -33.5% -73.5 129.3 -41.0% -89.7 107.7 -50.8% 181.2
Public healthcare 131.1 145.5 11.0% 14.4 129.3 -1.4% -1.9 107.7 -17.9% 93.4
Output prices Index Index % Index % Index %
Private healthcare 1.0 0.85 -15.2% 0.82 -18.0% 0.78 -21.7%
Public healthcare 1.0 1.0062 0.62% 0.95 -5.2% 0.87 -12.7%
Other health goods 1.0 1.0065 0.65% 1.02 2.0% 1.04 3.9%
Other goods 1.0 1.0056 0.56% 1.02 1.8% 1.04 3.5%
The table compares labor market outcomes (regulated vs. deregulated regime) with varying levels of the public-
private health care substitution elasticity, σh.
5.2 Adding the social value of public health care, E
The previous section reported results with only the economic welfare U , as in standard models. In
this section, we extend the definition of welfare towards well-being W . We include some of the non-
marketed social value of health care E from (13), which is unknown in monetary terms, and thus
U 6= W . We show situations whereby deregulating the health care system could risk lowering well-
being.
To impute the social value, we raise its unknown baseline value E0 from 0 to NIS 30 bln and
search for a value E∗ that would make households indifferent between the baseline-regulated and
counterfactual-deregulated health care systems. In other words, E∗ in the baseline will lead to a no
change in well-being in the counterfactual deregulated system.
Remember that because the marketed economy does not internalize the byproduct social value E
that it creates, the counterfactual equilibrium for commodity markets is identical to those already
reported in the previous sub-section 5.1. This means that production, output prices, health-labor
movement and wages do not change when E0 > 0 . The baseline social value is therefore irrelevant for
economic welfare, but relevant for well-being.
Figure 4 reports the gains (losses) to well-being for various levels of E0 and σh. Starting with
E0 = 0 (i.e., omitting the social value) would raise welfare - as previously reported. However, when
gradually raising E0, the increase in well-being falls in the counterfactual scenarios. Health-workers
migrate to the private sector, which increases its production but lowers public production. The result
is a reduction in the byproduct social value compared to the baseline that lowers household well-being.
In Figure 4, the arrows point to E∗ that would make well-being indifferent between the regulated and
deregulated systems. For example, with σh = 5, the required baseline value would be around NIS 9
bln. This is a minimum social value that covers for the distortions created by the regulated system.
The true social value is unknown: If its true value is higher than the minimum, deregulation would
then lower well-being (i.e., a regulated system is preferable). But if it is lower, deregulation would
raise well-being.
Figure 4 furthermore shows that higher σh would lower E∗ (e.g., when σh rises from 5 to 7, E∗ falls
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Figure 4: Well-being gains from deregulating, NIS mln
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The figure shows the social value of public health care E∗ that would make the regulated and deregulated systems
indifferent. E∗ falls as private and public health care become better substitutes (i.e., a rise in σh).
from 9 to NIS 5 bln).39 The explanation is the following: when private health care becomes a better
substitute for public health care, a smaller E∗ is required to impute an indifference because social
value becomes more precious. It also means that it becomes more likely that the true social value is
greater than the imputed value, and that deregulation would lower well-being. Brent (2016) similarly
explains this within the Marginal Excess Burden literature. As the demand price elasticity of public
health care becomes more inelastic, the Marginal Cost of Public Financing (MCF) becomes smaller. In
our case, this is analogous to an increase in σh.40
5.2.1 Imputing E∗ with a Monte Carlo simulation
To provide a concrete result of the indifference social value E∗, we use a Monte Carlo simulation to
randomly generate a range of σh ∈ [2, 10], σ1 ∈ [1, 2] and baseline social value E0 ∈ [2000, 22000]. Due
to a lack of a prior, parameters are generated from a uniform Probably Density Function (PDF), which
jointly enter the model.41 The model is executed 80,000 times, and all results close to no change in
well-being are analyzed (i.e., 599 occasions of 80,000 that fall between ∆W = [−0.005% ≤ 0 ≤ 0.005%]).
Figure 5 plots the imputed sample density of the social value E∗ that would make households
indifferent between a regulated and deregulated health care system. The imputed average is NIS
13.2 bln, with standard deviation of NIS 4.9 bln. The 99% confidence interval falls between NIS
39Not shown in the graph, with σh = 10, E∗ = 2.1 bln.
40For example, in the extreme case of σh → ∞, the imputed social value required to offset the additional economic gains of
deregulation approaches zero because the public sector shuts down, and any low level of social value becomes highly valuable.
41A uniform PDF gives equal probability to all randomly selected values along their chosen range.
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Figure 5: The probability density of the imputed social value E∗
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The figure presents the probability density of the imputed social value E∗ that would make households indifferent
between the regulated and deregulated health care systems. The model is executed 80,000 times and 599 results
with ∆W = 0 are collected. The sample average is NIS 13.2 bln and the 99% large sample confidence interval
falls between NIS [12.6, 13.7] bln.
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Table 7: Components of social welfare
bln NIS 2012 Social value as % of
Indifference social value 13.2
Public health care finance 50.3 26%
Private consumption 555.2 2.4%
GDP 1001 1.3%
Per capita social value NIS 1,668 USD 472 in 2019
Source: Model results and CBS Israel; In 2012, Israel’s population was 7.9 mln.
[12.6, 13.7] bln.42 As we summarize in Table 7, at the margin, the baseline social value must be at least
26% of public health care financing. The intuition is the following: social value is partially lost by
deregulation, but balanced by the gains in economic value, making well-being unchanged.
To our knowledge, this type of result is novel and therefore hard to compare with other studies. To
test its magnitude, we turn to related literature on the marginal excess burden (MEB) of distortionary
taxes used to finance public goods provision. Ballard et al. (1985) develop a multisector general equi-
librium model of the US economy with various categories of taxes. They find that public projects must
produce marginal social benefits of above 17% to 56% to be welfare improving. (The range depends on
the domain assumed for the elasticities.) Similarly, to compare the tax implication of a systems change,
Brent (2003) uses a partial equilibrium analysis of the US economy that lowers state financial respon-
sibilities for mental health care, and raises it for the federal government. He finds that state-level
MEBs are around 16.4% to 28% (for various US states), similar in magnitude to ours. Ballard et al.
(1985) and Brent (2003) argue that many projects accepted (rejected) by government agencies, based
on cost-benefit analysis, could have been overturned had they considered the MEB of distortionary
taxes. We make a similar point here.
More similar to us, Yerushalmi (2018) models the non-marketed agricultural amenities as a byprod-
uct of agricultural production, and imputes a minimum WTA amenity value at around 4% of GDP. This
is a minimum value that covers the economic distortions generated by the regulated water pricing
mechanism used in Israel. In comparison, we find the minimum net social value of public health care
at around 1.3% of GDP (see Table 7).
Finally, an alternative method to compare with others is to divide the social value by the Israeli
population in 2012. Table 7 reports that for the public to accept the current regulated health care
system, the social value must be at least higher than USD 472 in 2019 per capita (NIS 1,668 in 2012).43
In comparison, in a CVM study, Al-Hanawi et al. (2018) collect data from a pre-tested interviewer-
administered questionnaire and analyze it using a Tobit regression model. They estimate the WTP for
a contributory national health insurance scheme, in Saudi Arabia, at around USD 160 per capita. The
literature is clear on the discrepancy between WTA and WTP, whereby WTA tends to be three times
higher than WTP (Whynes and Sach, 2007; Grutters et al., 2008; Martín-Fernández et al., 2010). We
are therefore similar in magnitude to Al-Hanawi et al. (2018).
To our knowledge, no other macro-level studies exist, but there are countless of micro-level studies
for specific treatments/programs. Individually, these WTA/WTP estimates are much smaller than ours.
A future study could aggregate them into a unified basket to compare with our aggregate result.
42For a sample size n, the Central Limit Theorem states that the studentized mean is approximately a standard normal:
x¯−µ
s/
√
n
≈ N (0, 1) .
43Conversion to USD 2019 was based on the yearly average chained consumer price index (CPI) and yearly average exchange
rate (Israel CBS and Bank of Israel).
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6 Discussion: regulated or deregulated system for Israel?
Since the German Committee in 2013 (see German, 2014), the Israeli Ministry of Finance (MoF), other
ministries and the wider public community have debated whether health care should be deregulated
and privatization extended. The prevailing trend has been to halt privatization and focus on bolstering
the public system. Most of the debate has focused on the negative externalities imposed by private
health care on the public system (e.g., rising wage gaps, patients diverted towards private services,
and supplier induced demand) with limited economic gains (Ben Naim and Blinksy, 2019).44 But
framing the debate in terms of the social value of public health care is missing.
The Israeli MoF has not supported (and also blocked) the deepening of private services. Since
2018, this has also been the policy of the Ministry of Health, evident by the rise in public health care
financing - from 61% in 2012 to 64% in 2018 of total financing (CBS, 2019, Table 5). Our model,
calibrated for 2012 data, conveniently captures the peak of privatization under the regulated system.
Though we find that the minimum marginal social value is at least 26% of the public health care
financing, this trend suggests that the infra-marginal value is probably higher and that maintaining
a regulated system is likely preferable.
Yet, as mentioned previously, any system that internalizes the social value is better than one that
does not. A market mechanism might still do better than a regulated system because it would also
gain from the improved efficient allocation of resources. Glied (2008) suggests levying a tax on private
health care, which would partially fund the public sector and minimize the negative fiscal externali-
ties imposed on it. In this way, society internalizes the negative externalities, while enabling private
consumers to continue purchasing private health care and benefiting from efficient resource allocation.
The tax would reduce the transfer inequality onto complementary services, and a degree of equality
would be preserved. It would also generate revenues earmarked for increasing health services avail-
able to non-purchasers, without requiring new distortionary taxes.
Using a simple over-the-envelope calculation of Canada, Glied (2008) estimates the tax to be around
30%, which would depend on the extent of inequality in health care consumption viewed as acceptable,
on assumptions about rates of participation in the private sector, and the rate of growth of private and
public health care financing. This would ensure that for the next 20 years, average spending by private
purchasers would never be more than 30% higher than the average spending by non-purchasers.
We test such a tax using our applied model for Israel. We use the imputed social value of NIS 13.2
bln (previously reported) and randomly sample σh and σ1 using a Monte-Carlo framework. We raise
the tax levied on private health care production from 0% to 30%, and transfer its revenues directly
to the GHS to support public health care financing. For each tax bracket increment, the model is
simulated 3000 times.
Figure 6 reports that the optimal tax on private health care production should be around 15%. (The
figure also provides the 99% confidence interval around each point.) This suggests that de-regulation
would be a second best strategy because such a policy would only bring well-being (nearly) back up to
its baseline levels, or do worse. Hence, in Israel, a regulated system is preferable to a de-regulated
system.
44For example, a study by Israeli MoF estimates that in those public hospitals that were given permission to introduce private
services, physicians wage gaps increased dramatically; top quintile wages were 6.2 times higher than the lowest quintile, com-
pared to 4.7 in the rest of the public hospitals without private services. Furthermore, hospitals that introduced private health
care within public infrastructure had many more patients diverted towards the private system, compared to public hospitals
without private services (Ben Naim and Blinksy, 2019).
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Figure 6: The optimal tax on private health care (%)
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The figure presents the average change in well-being for different tax values levied on private health care. A 15%
tax on private health would maximize well-being in the deregulated system. (The figure also reports the 99%
confidence interval around each point.) However, this strategy is not better than the baseline regulated system
because welfare (nearly) returns to zero, or does worse; To generate this result, we use the imputed social value
E0 = 13.2, and for each tax bracket increment, the model is simulated 3000 times, randomly sampling σh and σ1.
The tax revenue accrued is directly transferred to the GHS.
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7 Conclusion
It is difficult to pinpoint the optimal balance between private and public health care provision and
finance. In recent years, in Israel and many other countries, a heated debate has ensued on the
best health care system. Those in favor of deepening the trend towards privatization argue that it
promises to improve efficiency and enable supply to catch-up with demand. Others, however, believe
that the public system must be protected and expanded because it provides a social value beyond the
measurable economic value. Since the social value of health care is non-marketed and hard to value,
it is often neglected, which would lead to misallocation of resources from society’s point of view. Our
novel computational CVM simulation imputes a net social value of around 26% of the public health
care financing. This is a minimum value that would make households indifferent between regulated
and deregulated health care, in “normal” times. The infra-marginal value is likely to be much higher.
The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the high lost social value when public health
care systems are underfunded. Virus spread rates are expected to be higher in countries lacking
universal health care because uninsured citizens will refrain from reaching clinics and hospitals, and
will continue spreading the disease. Furthermore, the private system focuses on profit generating
health activities that weaken preventative medicine. In these conditions, a market allocation is not
optimal and forgoes social value. For example, in Lombardy Italy, health care delivery is more focused
on private health systems, while in Veneto on the public system. This is said to be one explanation
for the dramatic difference in morbidity rates between the two regions. The USA is another example
whereby a neo-liberal administration deepened public health care measures and economic subsidies to
contain the virus and support the economy. In doing so, it illustrates their internalization of the social
value of health care on the economy. A future study could impute this value using a similar setup as
ours.
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A Israel’s 2012 Health Social Accounting Matrix1
As explained in Section 4 of the paper, we first constructed a detailed Health Israel Social Accounting2
Matrix (SAM) with 6 sectors. The matrix documents the financial transactions between agents in the3
economy with rows reporting for income (receipts) and columns expenditures (payments).4
Firms respond to demand by producing goods and services which they sell to households and the5
government. In order to produce these goods and services firms raise capital and employees. House-6
holds are the owners of labor and capital which they sell to the firms.7
With this data, we constructed a detailed SAM which has four health sectors, pharmaceutical, and8
all other industries as follows:9
1. Manufacture of pharmaceutical products for human and veterinary uses (industry code 82)10
2. Health services - general government non-profit institutions (industry code 188)11
3. Health services - general government (industry code no 189)12
4. Health services - private non-profit institutions (industry code 187)13
5. Health services - private commercial (industry code 190)14
6. All other industries15
∗Corresponding Author: Birmingham City Business School, Erez.Yerushalmi@bcu.ac.uk
†sani.ziv@gmail.com
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Table 8: Large health social accounting matrix, 2012
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B Calibrating substitution elasticity σ116
To calibrate the substitution elasticity between health and other goods, σ1, we use a method outlined17
by Shoven and Whalley (1992) and Perroni and Rutherford (1995) for any generalized nested-structure.18
σ1 is located in the second-level nest of the utility function (see Figure 3), and can be approximated by19
the compensated demand price elasticity for health  (obtained from the literature) and the cost shares20
θ (obtained from the Health SAM).21
At the baseline, we calibrate input prices and total expenditure to unity. The demand for health is22
therefore scaled by23
H = p−σ1H p
σ1−σ0
HO p
σ0
U H¯
with pH , pHO and pU the baseline values for health, H, sub-aggregate health and other goods, HO, and24
utility U (respectively). An over-bar, ¯, indicates values at the benchmark.25
The derivative of the demand for health with respect to its price (at the initial allocation point26
where all prices are unity) is27
∂H
∂pH
|p=1=
[
−σ1 + (σ1 − σ0) ∂pHO
∂pH
+ σ0
∂pU
∂pH
]
H¯ (B.1)
By Shephard’s Lemma, the derivative of the unit cost function with respect to input prices equals the28
share of inputs at the benchmark calibration, as follows29
∂pHO
∂pH
=
pHH¯
pHH¯ + pOO¯
= θ1
∂pU
∂pH
=
pW W¯
pU U¯
= θ0
Note that O¯ is the value for other goods, with pO its price. θ1 and θ0 are obtained from the Health SAM.30
Combining the above with Equation (B.1), obtain31
∂H
∂pH
|p=1= [−σ1 + (σ1 − σ0) θ1 + σ0θ0] H¯
Define the compensated elasticity of demand as  |p=1= ∂H∂pH
pH
H¯
, and therefore32
 |p=1= [−σ1 + (σ1 − σ0) θ1 + σ0θ0]
Finally, solving for for σ1 yields33
σ1 =
+ σ0 (θ1 − θ0)
(θ1 − 1) 
C Further Results34
Table 9 provides further results (in real terms) on the changes to consumption (expenditure) for the35
various sectors. Column 1 provides the baseline levels, while columns 2 through 4 report results for36
varying degrees of substitution elasticity between private and public health care goods (i.e., for σh = 2,37
5 or 10 in equation 6). Note that the externality associated with health care is not yet accounted for.38
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Table 9: Main results, real terms (million NIS)
Baseline
Level Level Level Level
mln NIS mln NIS % diff mln NIS % diff mln NIS % diff
Substitution elasticity between 
private and public healthcare
Public consumption of Public 
healthcare  production 46,796 44,684 -4.5% -2,113 40,684 -13.1% -6,112 33,729 -27.9% -13,067
Private consumption of Private 
healthcare  production 14,094 19,061 35.2% 4,967 26,893 90.8% 12,799 38,793 175.2% 24,699
Private consumption of Public 
healthcare  production 2,447 2,350 -4.0% -97 2,261 -7.6% -186 2,270 -7.2% -177
Private consumption of other 
health goods 11,755 12,254 4.2% 499 12,963 10.3% 1,208 13,962 18.8% 2,207
Total private health 
cosumption 28,296 33,665 19.0% 5,369 42,118 48.8% 13,822 55,025 94.5% 26,729
Total health cosumption 75,092 79,209 5.5% 4,116 85,157 13.4% 10,064 93,690  24.8% 18,597
Total other consumption 526,939 524,591 -0.4% -2,348 521,228 -1.1% -5,710 516,745 -1.9% -10,194
Total consumption 796,985 798,387 0.2% 1,402 800,167 0.4% 3,182 802,661 0.7% 5,676
Derugalaton (externlity = 0)
Change from Change from Change from 
2 5 10
Note: The table provides detailed results (in real terms) of the counterfactual and baseline simulations. The table excludes the social value of
public health care.
Table 10 reports the same data in nominal terms which accounts for the decline in the prices of39
health care. Thus, although total health consumption in real terms rises, the total expenditure in nom-40
inal terms remains stable at around 7.5% to 7.6% of GDP. The share of private financing rises to 49%41
(given elasticity of 5) compared to 38% in the baseline and reflects the sharp rise in private health care42
consumption. The decline in the public finance on health means reduction in health tax. Currently,43
the average health care tax is 8.4% which amounts to around NIS 46.8 billion. In the deregulation44
simulations, the health tax rate drops to 6.8% - a fall of 17.6%, and the amount of health tax collected45
drops to NIS 38.6 billion. Income tax rate (net of health care tax) remains fixed at 26.7% throughout46
the various simulations, but the amount of tax collected rises by 2.3% due to income growth.47
C.1 Sensitivity analysis48
We furthermore test alternative values for 0.25 ≤ σ1 ≤ 3, while holding all else equal. Figures 7 to 1049
show a convergences as σ1 rises, and that model well behaved.50
As σ1 rises, Figure 7 shows that the real expenditure on health care goods increases while it de-51
creases for other good. As Figure 8 shows, the weighted price of private and public health care falls52
(relative to the baseline), which raises the overall demand for health care goods. This coincides with53
an increase in health care production due to a greater increase in the production of private health care54
and a small fall in the production of public health care (see Figure 9). Finally, Figure 10 shows a rise55
in the number of health-labor employees that migrate from the public to private rises. It furthermore56
shows that welfare (i.e. total consumption expenditure) rises in the deregulated health care system57
(relative to the regulated baseline scenario) because the economy is more efficient and resource are58
allocated more efficiently. The main point in the paper however is that this conclusion might be wrong,59
and that well-being might fall when we do not internalize the net social value that health care creates.60
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Table 10: Main results, nominal terms (million NIS)
Baseline
Level Level Level Level
mln NIS mln NIS % diff mln NIS % diff mln NIS % diff
Substitution elasticity between 
private and public healthcare
Public consumption of 
Public healthcare  
production 46,796 44,962 -3.9% -1,834 38,574 -17.6% -8,222 29,453 -37.1% -17,343
Private consumption of Private 
healthcare  production 14,094 16,161 14.7% 2,067 22,056 56.5% 7,962 30,384 115.6% 16,289
Private consumption of Public 
healthcare  production 2,447 2,364 -3.4% -83 2,144 -12.4% -303 1,982 -19.0% -465
Private consumption of other 
health goods 11,755 12,333 4.9% 578 13,222 12.5% 1,467 14,503 23.4% 2,748
Total private health 
cosumption 28,296 30,859 9.1% 2,562 37,423 32.3% 9,126 46,869 65.6% 18,573
Total health cosumption 
(net taxes) 75,092 75,821 1.0% 728 75,997 1.2% 905 76,322 1.6% 1,230
Other consumption 526,939 527,537 0.1% 599 530,605 0.7% 3,666 534,930 1.5% 7,991
Total consumption (net of 
taxes) 602,031 603,358 0.2% 1,327 606,602 0.8% 4,571 611,252 1.5% 9,221
Income tax revenue 148,158 149,001 0.6% 843 151,571 2.3% 3,414 155,246 4.8% 7,088
Health tax revenue 46,796 44,962 -3.9% -1,834 38,574 -17.6% -8,222 29,453 -37.1% -17,343
Total Consumtpion 796,985 797,321 0.0% 336 796,748 0.0% -237 795,951 -0.1% -1,034
income tax rate 26.7% 26.7% 26.7% 26.7%
health tax rate 8.4% 8.1% 6.8% 5.1%
Derugalaton (externlity = 0)
Change from Change from Change from 
2 5 10
Note: The table provides detailed results (in nominal terms) of the counterfactual and baseline simulations, used to calculate the average health
tax.
Figure 7: Real expenditure (NIS mln 2012)
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Figure 8: Change in prices after deregulation (baseline
prices = 1)
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The figure plots the real expenditure on health care and other goods. As the substitution
elasticity between them rises, real expenditure on health care rises and falls for other goods.
The figure shows the simulated change in public and private health care prices after dereg-
ulation relative to the baseline. Private health care becomes relatively cheaper compared to
public health care. The overall prices of health care falls relative to baseline.
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Figure 9: Health care output (baseline output
= 1)
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Figure 10: Welfare and the number of health
care employees rise
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The figure plots the change in private and public output (production) relative to the baseline.
As the substitution elasticity rises, private production rises and public production falls.
The figure shows that the higher the substitution elasticity between health care and others,
the larger the number of employed workers will shift from the public to private health care.
Welfare rises as the substitution elasticity rises.
D The GAMS code61
Below is the GAMS code for the simulation. All data in excel format can be obtain upon request.62
scalar DocTrade Scalar flag for health rights trade /0/;63
64
$ontext65
$offlisting66
$offsymxref offsymlist67
option68
limrow = 0,69
limcol = 0,70
solprint = off,71
sysout = off;72
$offtext73
74
*===========================================================================================================75
* Defines the various sets in the model76
*===========================================================================================================77
SETS I MATRIX ACCOUNTS /Rel_Wage, Pri_H, Pub_H, Other, Externality, L_Pri, L_pub, L_oth, K,78
HH, gov_health, tax_health_N, VAT, tax_lab, tax_direct, tax_exter/79
a(i) activities /Pri_H, Pub_H, Other/80
tx(i) taxes and subsidy /tax_health_N, VAT, tax_lab, tax_direct, tax_exter/81
f(i) factors /L_Pri, L_pub, L_oth, K/82
l(i) labour /L_Pri, L_pub, L_oth/83
h(i) households /HH/84
;85
ALIAS(i,j), (a,aa);86
87
*============================================================================================================88
* LOADS the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)89
*============================================================================================================90
$CALL GDXXRW Various_SAM.xlsx O=sam par=SAM rng=Sam_v5-1!B17:P30 Cdim=1 Rdim=191
92
$GDXIN sam.gdx93
Parameter94
SAM(i,j) balanced matrix;95
$LOAD SAM96
$GDXIN97
parameter number /1/;98
SAM(i,j) = SAM(i,j)/number;99
display SAM;100
101
*============================================================================================================102
* Define sub-matrices103
*============================================================================================================104
105
PARAMETERS106
Y0(a) Base year output107
Int0(a,aa) Demand for Intermediate inputs by firm a108
LD0(l,a) Demand for Labor by firms of worker type l109
KD0(a) Demand for Capital by firm110
C0(a) Demand for consumption111
CT0 Total Household Expenditure112
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LS0(l) Labour supply Endowment113
KS0 Capital Supply Endowment114
KGS0 Capital spply governmen endowmnet115
116
G_health0 Government provision of healthcare117
G_h0(a) Government demand for healthcare (which is equivallent to provision)118
VAT0(a) VAT on sector output119
VAT(a) COUNTERFACTUAL change in VAT on sector output120
tax_lab0(a) Tax on labor wages baseline121
tax_lab(a) COUNTERFACTUAL tax on labor wage122
direct_tax_rev0 Total direct tax collected from household123
direct_tax0 BASELINE Direct household income tax124
direct_tax COUTNERFACTUAL Direct household income tax125
health_tax_rev0 Total tax health revenue collected from household126
tax_health0 BASELINE health tax127
tax_health COUNTERFACUTAL health tax128
129
HH0 Transfer from household to household130
sub_health substitution between private and public health products131
sub_oth_health Substitution between other and health products132
PL0(l) Baseline Wage Rates133
134
;135
*=============================================136
Y0(a) = sum(i,SAM(i,a));137
INT0(a,aa) = SAM(a,aa);138
LD0(l,a) = SAM(l,a);139
KD0(a) = SAM("K",a);140
LS0(l) = SAM("HH",l);141
KS0 = SAM("HH","K");142
KGS0 = SAM("gov_health","K");143
G_h0(a) = SAM(a,"gov_health");144
G_health0 = sum(a,G_h0(a));145
C0(a) = SAM(a,"HH");146
HH0 = SAM("HH","HH");147
CT0 = sum(a,C0(a));148
VAT0(a) = SAM("VAT",a)/Y0(a);149
VAT(a) = VAT0(a);150
tax_lab0(a) = SAM("tax_lab",a)/sum(l,SAM(l,a));151
tax_lab(a) = tax_lab0(a);152
direct_tax_rev0 = SAM("tax_direct","HH");153
direct_tax0 = SAM("tax_direct","HH")/CT0;154
direct_tax = direct_tax0;155
health_tax_rev0 = SAM("tax_health_N","HH");156
tax_health0 = health_tax_rev0/CT0;157
tax_health = tax_health0;158
sub_health = 10;159
sub_oth_health = 0.1;160
PL0(l) = SAM(l,"REl_Wage");161
162
Parameter163
externality0(a) baseline externality made by eacy sector /Pub_H 0.000001, Pri_H 0.000001, Other 0.000001/164
externality(a) counterfactual165
;166
externality(a) = externality0(a);167
display Y0, externality, INT0, LD0, PL0, KD0, KS0, INT0, C0, CT0 ,tax_health0,168
health_tax_rev0, VAT0, tax_lab0, HH0, G_h0 , G_health0;169
170
parameters171
sub subsidizing the public health care172
tax_exter(a) hundred percent externality tax173
;174
175
176
sub=0;177
tax_exter(a)=1;178
179
$ontext180
181
$model:health182
183
$sectors:184
Y1(a) ! production185
Y2(a)186
C ! Consumption (utility) before externality187
UTIL ! utility level188
DOC1$DocTrade ! Doctors transfers189
DOC2$DocTrade ! Doctors transfers190
G ! Production of government services191
192
$commodities:193
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PY1(a) ! Price of output194
PY(a) ! Price of output after CET of externality195
P_exter(a) ! Shadow price of externality196
PL(l) ! wage of various types of laborer197
PK ! rent on capital198
PC ! consumer price index of private goods199
PU ! CPI of total utility200
PG ! Price index of government services201
PG_U ! Price index of gov services as viewed by households202
203
204
$consumers:205
HH206
GOV_inc207
DEAD ! Deadweight Loss208
209
$AUXILIARY:210
LGP_operate ! Level of government provision for operations211
tax_health_N ! tax on consumption212
213
* allow doctors to move around214
$prod:DOC1$DocTrade215
o:PL("L_Pub") q:0.9999216
i:PL("L_Pri") q:1217
218
$prod:DOC2$DocTrade219
o:PL("L_Pri") q:0.9999220
i:PL("L_Pub") q:1221
222
223
*production of public health - it also creates the externality224
$prod:Y1(a) s:0 s1(s):1225
o:PY1(a) q:Y0(a) a:HH t:VAT(a)226
i:PY(aa) q:INT0(aa,a) s:0227
i:PL(l) q:(LD0(l,a)/(PL0(l))) P:(PL0(l)*(1+tax_lab0(a))) s1: a:HH t:tax_lab(a)228
i:PK q:KD0(a) s1:229
230
*production of public health - it also creates the externality231
$prod:Y2(a) t:0232
o:P_exter(a) q:externality(a) a:HH t:tax_exter(a)233
o:PY(a) q:Y0(a)234
i:PY1(a) q:Y0(a)235
236
* Government buys public health production operations237
$PROD:G s:sub_health238
O:PG q:(G_h0("Pub_H") + G_h0("Pri_H"))239
i:PY("Pub_H") q:G_h0("Pub_H")240
i:PY("Pri_H") q:G_h0("Pri_H")241
242
243
$prod:C s:sub_oth_health s_h1(s):sub_health244
o:PC q:(sum(a,(C0(a)))+G_health0 + health_tax_rev0 )245
i:PY("Pri_H") q:C0("Pri_H") P:(1+tax_health0) s_h1: A:GOV_inc N:tax_health_N A:DEAD t:DW_tax246
i:PY("Pub_H") q:C0("Pub_H") P:(1+tax_health0) s_h1: A:GOV_inc N:tax_health_N247
i:PY("Other") q:C0("Other") P:(1+tax_health0) A:GOV_inc N:tax_health_N248
i:PG_U q:(G_h0("Pub_H") + G_h0("Pri_H")) s_h1: ! Household gets for free249
250
251
$prod:UTIL s:0.1252
o:PU q:(CT0+G_health0 + sum(a,externality(a)) + health_tax_rev0 )253
i:P_exter(a) q:externality(a)254
I:PC q:(CT0+G_health0 + health_tax_rev0 )255
* i:pg_exter q:3256
257
258
$demand:HH259
d:PU260
e:PL(l) q:(LS0(l)/PL0(l)) ! endowment of real people because value/wage261
e:PG_U q: (G_h0("Pub_H") + G_h0("Pri_H")) R:LGP_operate262
e:PK q:KS0263
e:PU q:HH0264
e:PU q:direct_tax_rev0265
e:PU q:(-direct_tax_rev0)266
267
* Gov collects health tax and demands government services268
$demand:GOV_inc269
d:PG q:(G_h0("Pub_H") + G_h0("Pri_H"))270
e:PK q:KGS0271
272
$demand:DEAD273
d:PC274
8 of 14
E. Yerushalmi and S. Ziv, Supplementary Material for Online Publication ONLY
275
* gov produces a services which is given free to hoseholds by making them endowed with it endogensouly.276
$CONSTRAINT:LGP_operate277
LGP_operate =E= G;278
279
* the price of the gov price index equals the price index provided to households for free280
$CONSTRAINT:tax_health_N281
PG =E= PG_U;282
283
284
$REPORT:285
V:C_pri i:PY("Pri_H") PROD:C286
V:C_pub i:PY("Pub_H") PROD:C287
V:C_other i:PY("Other") PROD:C288
V:Ctot O:PC PROD:c289
V:Utot O:PU PROD:UTIL290
V:G_pri i:PY("Pri_h") PROD:G291
V:G_pub i:PY("Pub_h") PROD:G292
V:G_tot i:PG_U PROD:C293
V:G_tot2 i:PG PROD:G294
V:DOC_Mov1 O:PL("L_Pub") PROD:DOC1295
V:DOC_Mov2 O:PL("L_Pri") PROD:DOC2296
V:Lab_all(l,a) i:PL(L) PROD:Y1(a)297
V:Cap_all(a) I:PK PROD:Y1(a)298
V:val_exter(a) o:P_exter(a) PROD:Y2(a)299
300
301
$offtext302
303
304
$sysinclude mpsgeset health305
option decimals = 2;306
PU.FX=1;307
* PC.FX=1;308
* PK.FX=1;309
310
**************311
* baseline312
* no trade between private and public doctors313
* externality is zero314
315
316
317
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);318
* tax_health_N.FX = health_tax_rev0/(CT0+G_health0);319
PL.L("L_pri") = PL0("L_pri");320
LGP_operate.L = 1;321
* LGP_siodi.L = 1;322
DocTrade = 0;323
tax_exter(a)=1;324
health.iterlim = 1000;325
326
* $ontext327
$include health.gen328
solve health using mcp;329
330
***********************************************331
* DOCTOR MOVMENT ALLOWED - Private and public doctors can move around332
* externality is zero333
* public doctors move to private care to make more money334
* utility rises, PUBLIC CARE falls, PRIVATE CARE rises335
336
Y1.L(a) = 1;337
Y2.L(a) = 1;338
C.L =1;339
UTIL.L = 1;340
G.L =1;341
PY1.L(a)=1;342
PY.L(a)=1;343
P_exter.L(a)=1;344
PL.L(l)=1;345
PK.L = 1;346
PC.L = 1;347
PU.L = 1;348
PG.L=1;349
PG_U.L=1;350
351
* DW_tax = 0.2;352
LGP_operate.L = 1;353
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);354
355
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DocTrade = 1;356
tax_exter(a)=1;357
358
359
360
health.iterlim = 8000;361
$include health.gen362
solve health using mcp;363
* $offtext364
365
366
*======================================================================367
* All model RUNS368
*======================================================================369
370
set scall Scenarios /level, base, sc1*sc30/371
scbase(scall) Baseline /base/372
sc1(scall) Open doctor trade /sc1/373
sc2(scall) Different elasticity /sc2/374
sc3(scall) Externality /sc3/375
sc4(scall) Externality /sc4/376
sclev(scall) Levels in Baseline /level/377
* sc(scall) SCENARIOS TO BE RUN /base, sc1*sc2/378
sc(scall) SCENARIOS TO BE RUN /base, sc1,sc3*sc4/379
;380
381
382
*****************************************************************************************************383
* REPORTING STARTS HERE384
*****************************************************************************************************385
386
387
388
******************************************************************************389
*****************************************************************************************************390
* REPORTING STARTS HERE391
*****************************************************************************************************392
393
parameter394
Y1_sc(a,sc) Output level without externality395
Y2_sc(a,sc) Output level with externality396
C_sc(sc) Consumption level397
Util_sc(sc) Utility level - includes externality398
G_sc(sc) Government healthcare services399
PY1_sc(a,sc)400
PY_sc(a,sc)401
P_EXTER_sc(a,sc)402
PL_sc(l,sc)403
PK_sc(sc)404
PC_sc(sc)405
PU_sc(sc)406
PG_sc(sc)407
PG_U_sc(sc)408
HH_sc(sc)409
GOV_inc_sc(sc)410
DEAD_sc(sc)411
Tax_health_sc(sc)412
413
C_Pri_sc(sc) Household consumpton of private health414
C_Pub_sc(sc) Household consumpton of public health415
416
C_Oth_sc(sc) Household consumpton of other417
G_Pri_sc(sc) Household consumpton of private health418
G_Pub_sc(sc) Household consumpton of public health419
420
C_tot_health_sc(sc) Household total cons of health421
G_tot_health_sc(sc) Gov total cons of health422
Doc_mov1_sc(sc)423
Doc_mov2_sc(sc)424
425
Lab_all_sc(l,a,sc)426
Cap_all_sc(a,sc)427
sub_health_sc(sc) substition elasticity for health products428
sub_oth_health_sc(sc) substitution elasticty between other and health products429
externality_sc(a,sc) externality430
val_exter_sc(a,sc) Value of externality431
Ctot_sc(sc)432
Utot_sc(sc)433
434
RESULT(*,*,*,*) Main Table with Aggregate Results435
;436
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*************************************************************437
438
439
loop(sc,440
* re-initialize baseline441
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);442
PL.L("L_pri") = PL0("L_pri");443
LGP_operate.L = 1;444
DocTrade = 0;445
tax_exter(a)=1;446
447
Y1.L(a) = 1;448
Y2.L(a) = 1;449
C.L =1;450
UTIL.L = 1;451
G.L =1;452
PY1.L(a)=1;453
PY.L(a)=1;454
P_exter.L(a)=1;455
PL.L(l)=1;456
PK.L = 1;457
PC.L = 1;458
PU.L = 1;459
PG.L=1;460
PG_U.L=1;461
DOC_mov2.L = 0;462
463
LGP_operate.L = 1;464
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);465
466
DocTrade = 1;467
tax_exter(a)=1;468
*******************************469
* Baseline470
if(scbase(sc),471
DocTrade = 0;472
sub_health = 10;473
sub_oth_health = 0.1;474
externality("pub_h") = 0.0000001;475
);476
477
* Doctor Trade478
if(sc1(sc),479
DocTrade = 1;480
sub_health = 10;481
sub_oth_health = 0.1;482
externality("pub_h") = 0.0000001;483
);484
485
* Doctor Trade but lower substitution486
if(sc2(sc),487
DocTrade = 1;488
sub_health = 5;489
sub_oth_health = 0.1;490
);491
492
* Doctor Trade but lower substitution493
if(sc3(sc),494
DocTrade = 0;495
sub_health = 10;496
sub_oth_health = 0.1;497
externality("pub_h") = 400;498
);499
500
* Doctor Trade but lower substitution501
if(sc4(sc),502
DocTrade = 1;503
sub_health = 10;504
sub_oth_health = 0.1;505
externality("pub_h") = 400;506
);507
508
*******************509
PU.FX=1;510
*******************511
512
513
514
$include health.GEN515
SOLVE health USING MCP;516
ABORT$(health.OBJVAL > 0.001) "Model does not calibrate.";517
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518
519
******************************************520
* Placing scalars into time series521
******************************************522
523
Y1_sc(a,sc) = Y1.L(a);524
Y2_sc(a,sc) = Y2.L(a);525
C_sc(sc) = C.L;526
Util_sc(sc) = Util.L;527
G_sc(sc) = G.L;528
529
PY1_sc(a,sc) = PY1.L(a);530
PY_sc(a,sc) = PY.L(a);531
P_EXTER_sc(a,sc)= P_exter.L(a);532
PL_sc(l,sc) = PL.L(l);533
PK_sc(sc) = PK.L;534
PC_sc(sc) = PC.L;535
PU_sc(sc) = PU.L;536
PG_sc(sc) = PG.L;537
PG_U_sc(sc) = PG_U.L;538
HH_sc(sc) = HH.L;539
GOV_inc_sc(sc) = GOV_INC.L;540
DEAD_sc(sc) = DEAD.L;541
Tax_health_sc(sc) = Tax_health_N.L;542
sub_health_sc(sc) = sub_health;543
sub_oth_health_sc(sc) = sub_oth_health;544
externality_sc(a,sc) = externality(a);545
val_exter_sc(a,sc) = val_exter.L(a);546
547
C_pri_sc(sc) = C_pri.L;548
C_pub_sc(sc) = C_pub.L;549
C_oth_sc(sc) = C_other.L;550
G_pri_sc(sc) = G_pri.L;551
G_pub_sc(sc) = G_pub.L;552
553
C_tot_health_sc(sc) = C_pri.L + C_pub.L;554
G_tot_health_sc(sc) = G_pri.L + G_pub.L;555
Ctot_sc(sc) = Ctot.L;556
Utot_sc(sc) = Utot.L;557
Doc_mov1_sc(sc) = DOC_mov1.L;558
Doc_mov2_sc(sc) = DOC_mov2.L;559
560
561
Lab_all_sc(l,a,sc) = Lab_all.L(l,a);562
Cap_all_sc(a,sc) = Cap_all.L(a);563
564
565
566
* re-initialize baseline567
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);568
PL.L("L_pri") = PL0("L_pri");569
LGP_operate.L = 1;570
DocTrade = 0;571
tax_exter(a)=1;572
DOC_mov2.L = 0;573
Y1.L(a) = 1;574
Y2.L(a) = 1;575
C.L =1;576
UTIL.L = 1;577
G.L =1;578
PY1.L(a)=1;579
PY.L(a)=1;580
P_exter.L(a)=1;581
PL.L(l)=1;582
PK.L = 1;583
PC.L = 1;584
PU.L = 1;585
PG.L=1;586
PG_U.L=1;587
588
* DW_tax = 0.2;589
LGP_operate.L = 1;590
tax_health_N.L = health_tax_rev0/(CT0);591
592
* DocTrade = 1;593
* tax_exter(a)=1;594
*******************************595
596
);597
598
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**************************************************************599
* E N D L O O P600
**************************************************************601
* other variables made602
603
* RESULTS TABLE604
605
RESULT("Substitution elasticity","pri-pub-health","",sc) = sub_health_sc(sc);606
RESULT("Substitution elasticity","other-health","",sc) = sub_oth_health_sc(sc);607
RESULT("Variable3","health","",sc) = sub_health_sc(sc);608
RESULT("Variable4","health","",sc) = sub_health_sc(sc);609
RESULT("Externality","health",a,sc) = externality_sc(a,sc);610
RESULT("Output level before externality","Y1",a,sc) = Y1_sc(a,sc);611
RESULT("Output level including externality","Y2",a,sc) = Y2_sc(a,sc);612
RESULT("Consumption level - no externality","REAL","C",sc) = C_sc(sc);613
RESULT("Utility level - with externality","REAL","Util",sc) = Util_sc(sc);614
RESULT("Gov services level","REAL","G",sc) = G_sc(sc);615
RESULT("PY1 Price of output - before externality","PY1",a,sc) = PY1_sc(a,sc) ;616
RESULT("PY Price of output - including externality","PY",a,sc) = PY_sc(a,sc) ;617
RESULT("Labor Wage","PL",l,sc) = PL_sc(l,sc) ;618
RESULT("Price of Capital","","PK",sc) = PK_sc(sc) ;619
RESULT("Consumer Price Index - before externality","","PC",sc) = PC_sc(sc) ;620
RESULT("Consumer Price Index - including externality","","PU",sc) = PU_sc(sc) ;621
RESULT("Price index Gov Health Services","PG","",sc) = PG_sc(sc) ;622
RESULT("Price index HH endowed Gov Health Services","PG_U","",sc) = PG_U_sc(sc) ;623
RESULT("HH Dispoable Income","","HH",sc) = HH_sc(sc) ;624
RESULT("Gov Disposable Income","","GOV_inc",sc) = GOV_inc_sc(sc) ;625
RESULT("Dead Weight Loss","","DEAD",sc) = DEAD_sc(sc) ;626
RESULT("Endogenous Health Tax","","tax_health_N",sc) = Tax_health_sc(sc);627
RESULT("REAL HH private health","consumption","C_pri",sc) = C_pri_sc(sc);628
RESULT("REAL HH public health","consumption","C_pub",sc) = C_pub_sc(sc);629
RESULT("REAL HH Other","consumption","c_oth",sc) = C_oth_sc(sc);630
RESULT("REAL Gov private health","consumption","G_pri",sc) = G_pri_sc(sc);631
RESULT("REAL Gov public health","consumption","G_pub",sc) = G_pub_sc(sc);632
RESULT("Doctor Movement","","DOC2",sc) = Doc_mov2_sc(sc);633
RESULT("NOMINAL HH private health","consumption","C_pri",sc) = PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*C_pri_sc(sc);634
RESULT("NOMINAL HH public health","consumption","C_pub",sc) = PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*C_pub_sc(sc);635
RESULT("NOMINAL HH Other","consumption","c_oth",sc) = PY1_sc("Other",sc)*C_oth_sc(sc);636
RESULT("NOMINAL Gov private health","consumption","G_pri",sc) = PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*G_pri_sc(sc);637
RESULT("NOMINAL Gov public health","consumption","G_pub",sc) = PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*G_pub_sc(sc);638
RESULT("NOMINAL HH total consumption of health","consumption","C_tot_health",sc)639
= PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*C_pri_sc(sc) + PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*C_pub_sc(sc);640
RESULT("NOMINAL Gov total health services","consumption","G_tot_health",sc)641
= PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*G_pri_sc(sc) + PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*G_pub_sc(sc);642
RESULT("NOMINAL total consumption","consumption","tot_cons",sc)643
= PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*C_pri_sc(sc) + PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*C_pub_sc(sc)644
+ PY1_sc("Other",sc)*C_oth_sc(sc) + PY1_sc("Pri_h",sc)*G_pri_sc(sc)645
+ PY1_sc("Pub_h",sc)*G_pub_sc(sc);646
RESULT("REAL Labor Demand",l,a,sc) = Lab_all_sc(l,a,sc);647
RESULT("REAL Capital demand ","REAL cap",a,sc) = cap_all_sc(a,sc);648
RESULT("Price of Externality","P_EXTER",a,sc) = P_EXTER_sc(a,sc);649
RESULT("REAL Value of EXternality","REAL exter",a,sc) = 999;650
RESULT("NOMINAL Value of EXternality","NOMINAL exter",a,sc) = 999;651
RESULT("REAL Value of EXternality","REAL exter",a,sc) = val_exter_sc(a,sc);652
RESULT("NOMINAL Value of EXternality","NOMINAL exter",a,sc) = P_EXTER_sc(a,sc)*val_exter_sc(a,sc);653
RESULT("REAL CTot","REAL","",sc) = Ctot_sc(sc);654
RESULT("NOMINAL Ctot","NOMINAL","",sc) = PC_sc(sc)*Ctot_sc(sc);655
RESULT("REAL UTot","REAL","",sc) = Utot_sc(sc);656
RESULT("NOMINAL Utot","NOMINAL","",sc) = PU_sc(sc)*Utot_sc(sc);657
658
option decimals=1;659
display RESULT;660
661
$ontext662
$onecho>task.txt663
******************************664
* Aggregate Level Tables665
******************************666
text="Percent change of activity output by scenario" rng=Act1x45!A1667
par=Y_ag_sc rng=Act1x45!B14668
par=Y_sc rng=Act1x45!B33669
670
671
$offecho672
$offtext673
674
675
Execute ’xlstalk.exe -S RESULT.xlsx’ ;676
execute_unload ’RESULT.gdx’, RESULT;677
678
execute ’gdxxrw.exe RESULT.gdx O=RESULT.xlsx par=RESULT rng=Agg!a4’;679
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Execute ’xlstalk.exe -O RESULT.xlsx’ ;680
Reference - Supplementary Appendix681
Perroni, C. and T. F. Rutherford: 1995, ‘Regular flexibility of nested CES functions’. European Eco-682
nomic Review 39(2), 335–343.683
Shoven, J. B. and J. Whalley: 1992, Applying General Equilibrium. Cambridge University Press.684
14 of 14
